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ABSTRACT
Extremism Video Detector in Social Media
Akash Rao
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Department of Mathematics
Texas A&M University
Research Faculty Advisor: Dr. James Caverlee
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Texas A&M University
Social media has grown to become a fundamental part of our lives over the past two decades
and with its growth, the misuse of the platform for extremist purposes has become common. The
wide reach of social media has allowed extremist groups to take advantage of the platform to spread
terrorist propaganda and fear. Therefore, the need for a robust extremist detector in social media is
evident.
As an attempt to combat this problem, we present techniques to detect various forms of
extremism in videos crawled from Twitter, a social media to share short posts. We build upon
existing deep neural networks used for action classification and create a model capable of recog-
nizing certain common extremism types. Additionally, we also expand on logo/object detection
models for the same purpose. We then use these models against a sample space of roughly 2
million unlabelled videos to test the accuracy of these models.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As social media grows as a platform, it has become the first destination for many to ac-
cess the news, share thoughts about any matter, keep up with one’s country’s political situation
etc. For example, 50%-60% of adults in the US say they use popular social media platforms like
YouTube, Twitter or Facebook at least once a day with about 18% of US adults relying on social
media as their primary source of news [1, 2]. This widespread use allows influencers from around
the world to spread their messages to anyone with access to the internet. However, with its spread
and utility also comes shortcomings such as abuse of the platform for terrorist propaganda, spread
of extremism and even insinuation of violence. For example, YouTube, a popular video sharing
platform, removed roughly 170,000 videos were removed for hate speech or violent acts promoted
by foreign terrorist organizations in Q4 2020 out of approximately 65 million minutes of content
uploaded during the same time [3, 4]. Therefore, an automatic system of detecting such content
before it receives too much attention is of great necessity.
In order to flag such type of content, social media companies employ three main techniques.
First is the usage of automatic checking systems that check for uploaded content against other con-
tent that has been flagged and basic sanity check against the text and other meta data uploaded as
part of a social media post. Secondly, companies employ experts from around the world to man-
ually check certain content to ensure policy guidelines in their respective platforms. And finally,
they use a system that allows users to report content that they think violates certain guidelines,
through which content can be subsequently taken down.
There is little public knowledge of the specific methods that guide these three main ap-
proaches, however, in literature automated methods have received the most attention with an em-
phasis on inference from textual content. This may be in the form of tweets from Twitter, blogs
from Tumblr, or video meta data such as title, captions and comments from YouTube. However,
we believe that there is valuable information to be gained from the visual elements of social media
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posts such as images and videos. Take for example the images presented in Figure 1.1, we can
see that this type of imagery containing an armed man, waving the ISIS flag and walking down the
street is clearly extremist and demonstrating radical actions. If this post were accompanied by text
describing the situation, flagging it might be relatively easy, however, even without any accompa-
nying text we can notice patterns that would immediately strike this content as suspicious.
Figure 1.1: Example of clearly extremist video
Based on this reasoning, we propose an extremism video detector that takes into account
specifically visual input in the form of short video clips to identify unseen videos as possibly ex-
tremist. We first expand on the work in the field of action recognition and hope that extremism
can be incorporated as a comparable class to the set of action classes commonly considered. Next,
we approach the problem with in a more ad hoc manner and hope to exploit logo/symbol detection
to extract extremist videos from our large unlabelled dataset of short video clips. With these two
approaches we hope to create a robust classification model that is capable to detecting extrem-
ist/radical content avoiding some of the pitfalls mentioned below.
In regards to our approach of creating a video extremism/radicalization detector we antici-
pate and face the following challenges,
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1. Lack of a standard dataset. Unfortunately, there does not exist a commonly used dataset
of extremist/radical videos upon which to train/evaluate our model and more importantly
compare it to other models designed to do the same. However, we will address this problem
in the dataset section.
2. Class imbalance. In a production setting, there could be only a fraction of a percentage of
videos that could potentially contain traces of extremism or radical content. And this might
even vary from geographic location, language, time of day etc. This means that our model
should not be too eager to classify lots of videos as suspicious, but at the same time not avoid
classifying any videos as extremist in order to achieve a higher accuracy.
3. Computational efficiency. Although image classification has become quite efficient in mod-
ern times, video classification adds another dimension to this problem, and hence can require
additional resources and time to build more sophisticated models. We need to keep this in
mind when building our classifier.
Our contributions discussed in the remainder of this thesis will mainly include the discussion
of a semi-novel technique to the heavily studied field of predicting and identifying extremism
from social media content. Additionally, we also propose, implement and compare two different
approaches of using short video clips that we crawled from Twitter in order to train a model and
test its classification performance on unlabeled data. We will also briefly mention a few more
approaches that have not been implemented but that we see potential in in performing the task that
we are tackling. Finally, we introduce a new dataset that could potentially serve as a standard video
dataset wherein further research on video extremism detection could be based on.
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2. RELATED WORK
The area of utilising social media content in order to either classify future content as ex-
tremist or potentially radical, or perform extremist activity forecasting has been widely studied.
Moreover, the area of computer vision, specifically action recognition and video classification is a
very hotly studied research area as well. But, we feel that our research lies within the intersection
of these two fields but is heavily inspired by some of the works from this domain. In this section,
we will perform a literature review of our best knowledge assessing different methodologies and
techniques employed by these papers.
2.1 Online Radicalization Prediction and Identification using Social Media
As social media has expanded to become a crucial interpersonal communication medium,
terrorist organisations have taken advantage of the system for purposes such as recruitment of new
members, spreading of their ideologies and messages, displaying violent and extremist content to
emphasise their mission and even provide early warning to terrorist attacks on countries. There-
fore, the use of algorithms and artificial intelligence to use these patterns to prevent such activities
on social media has been widely studied. For example, [5] uses a classic K-nearest neighbours
(KNN) and support vector machine (SVM) in order to classify tweets as belonging to a class of
hate promoting tweets or unknown class. More concretely, tweets are described by a feature vector
{f1(I), . . . fm(I)} where fi(I) is the i’th instance value for a tweet, I , with a total of m discrim-
inatory features and the specific distance function used is an l2 norm or Euclidean norm. Even in
studies that consider visual content such as [6]’s attempt to identify extremist content in video shar-
ing sites, attempts are made to utilise video meta data such as video title, description and comments
followed by classification through SVMs. In a literature review of different studies researching the
use of social media posts for online radicalization identification we can see this heavy reliance of
textual data from Figure 2.1 [7]. Specifically, we see a greater number of papers relying on social
media content like tweets, blogs and meta data and applying corresponding classification tech-
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niques that have been used traditionally for such textual data. Techniques such as these that rely
heavily on textual information can pose certain problems. For instance, variation in the types of
textual data differing in writing style, grammar errors, misspelt words or even language variation
among data can introduce noise into the model and increase the complexity of the problem from a
practical standpoint.
Figure 2.1: Number of publications over time and the datasource for online radicalization detection
Although these problems need to be overcome in the analysis of text-only social media
posts, we believe that for posts that are accompanied with visual aids such as videos or pictures,
such content can be more universal and allow us to neglect problems associated with natural lan-
guage.
2.2 Video classification and Action Recognition
The first real large scale implementation of video classification mirroring the successes of
image recognition arguable came from Karpathy et. al in 2014. In their paper, they show that
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and their variations are capable of reproducing accuracy
levels seen in image/object recognition tasks but in action recognition [8]. Specifically they use
a dynamic dataset of 1 million YouTube videos, Sports-1M, of sports clips with 487 classes and
achieve approximately 80% accuracy in top 5 video category. More importantly and relevant to
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our research is that they were able to achieve greater on smaller datasets by employing transfer
learning and retraining/ fine-tuning only top-k layers of an already pretrained model. The central
idea here is the pretrained models are quite capable of capturing generic features that are domain-
independent and reusing this learning has been proved to be beneficial. More recently, Hara et.
al. have shown great advances in action recognition using very deep CNN architectures with 3D
CNN kernels as opposed to just 2D kernels as seen in image recognition tasks. Moreover, they use
residual neural networks (ResNets for short) in order to create bypass connections in the network
and facilitate training of very deep models that are capable of capturing very high level features
[9]. For example, their models acheive a 84.4% Top-5 accuracy on the extremely large Kinetics
dataset with over 700 classes and 650,000+ videos clips. In fact, we hope to expand on their work,




3.1 Phase I: Classification into Extremist Sub-classes
In Phase I of experimentation, our problem very much resembles that of traditional action
classification in videos, except we are now considering labels such as "Dead Person", "Bombing"
etc. instead of "Applying Lipstick" or "Push Ups". We call the set of these labels Labelsextremism.
If we consider a specific video, v, and determine a confidence score array from our model, {s1, s2, . . . sn}
where si corresponds to how confident our model is that v belongs to the i’th subclass inLabelsextremism.
The main idea behind separating videos into different sub-classes of extremism is to further help
the model understand the intricacies of each type of extremist video. If instead, we were to simply
consider the set of labels extremism and unknown, there would a wide range of videos falling into
each category making it harder to narrow down labelling for a specific unseen video.
In Figure 3.1, we can see a visual depiction of the Hara et. al. 156 layer deep ResNet
model that we have employed to perform classification into extremist sub classes. This model
was trained on the Kinetics dataset and hence predicts confidence scores for 700 actions that the
input video could contain. In Figure 3.2, we see how this model is now fine tuned by adjusting
the weights of the last few layers (represented by the orange in the figure), therefore, transferring
knowledge from the Kinetics domain, but then redesigning the model to predict classes that belong
to Labelsextremism.
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Figure 3.1: Visual Depiction of Hara et. al. Model
Figure 3.2: Visual Depiction of Fine Tuning Last Layers
3.2 Phase II: Classification based on Iconography
In this second phase, we attempt to use logo/object detection in order to classify videos as
extremist. This idea was spawn about because a large portion of our labelled dataset contains ISIS
videos, which contain a lot of iconography and symbols. We hope to use these patterns in order
to identify more ISIS videos from our unlabelled dataset. For example, in Figure 3.3, we see the
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ISIS flag waving in the top right hand corner of the video clip. This can be seen on several of their
videos, albeit in different locations and irregularly throughout the videos.
Figure 3.3: Typical location of iconography in videos
Figure 3.4: Examples of some more ISIS-related iconography (ISIS Flag, Man Making and Al
Hayat)
In Figure 3.4, we can see examples of a few more instances of the ISIS flag and also additional
symbols that also occurs with regular frequency.
We pose this as an object detection problem, where the objects are namely the symbols in the
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videos. Suppose we define our list of icons as Icons = {i1, i2, . . . in}, then our model takes a
single frame, f , from a video and outputs a confidence score {s1, s2, . . . , sn} where sj corresponds
to how confident our model is that icon ij is detected in the image. For this purpose we will be
using a Single Shot Multi Box Detector (SSD) network architecture that has been quite popular
in this domain [10]. We mainly choose this model over other types of architectures such as You
Only Look Once (YOLO) and variations of R-CNNs because of their great performance in terms of
accuracy as well as speed at which they can perform object detection [10, 11]. More specifically, on
the PASCAL Visual Object Classes Challenge 2007 with classes like person, bird, bottle, chair etc.
SSD architecture models attained 79.3% accuracy whereas YOLO and Faster R-CNN architectures
attained 63.4% and 73.2% respectively [10, 12].
We will be extending off of the work1 from Machine Learning Engineer, Hugo Zanini who
created an end-to-end object detection solution using Tensorflow. This application was based on a
model built to detect kangaroos, but we modify it to instead detect ISIS flags, since this particular
symbol occurs with greatest frequency and is clearly distinct from the rest of the symbols which
are all variations of Arabic writing could potential result in inaccurate classifications when we are




In this section, we first expand on the dataset used for experiments along with their limita-
tions. Next, we describe the different approaches implemented to achieve our objective of detect-
ing whether videos belong to a specific subclass of extremism. We will also portray the reasoning
behind the choices made along the way as well as the results of each experiment.
4.1 Dataset
Since there is no commonly used dataset for extremism video classification we use a custom
dataset crawled from Twitter restricted to the Middle Eastern region. In total, we have 2,840,588
videos of varying length, subject material, aspect ratio and resolution. Of the roughly 2.8 million
videos, we have manually identified 56 videos containing different types of extremism particularly
graphic scenes and terrorist propaganda demonstrated by the organization ISIS. For some context,
in Figure 4.1 we see examples of non extremist videos acquired from our dataset and in Figure
4.2 we see examples of some non-graphic extremist videos.
In order to facilitate classification we further narrowed down these videos into sub-classes of
extremism that are summarized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Sub-classes of Extremism labelled in Dataset
Extremism sub-class Video count







We observe that there are only a limited number of videos in each class relative to other standard
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Figure 4.1: Screen captures of non-extremist videos from dataset
Figure 4.2: Screen captures of extremist (non graphic) videos from dataset
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video classification datasets such as UCF-101 with > 100 videos in each category and Kinetics-
700 with 600− 1150 videos in each of the 700 classes. However, we hope to exploit [9]’s ResNet
model’s fine tuning capacity which has been proven to transfer training from one domain to an-
other, especially with such limited training data. Transfer learning has been quite beneficial, since
pretrained models have shown promise due to their ability to learn generic features (like edges and
shapes) that are common across multiple datasets and even generic actions like body-motion or
human-object interaction etc. [8].
In order to faciliate objection detection in images, we split each of our videos into 10 evenly
spaces frames and then manually provide bounding boxes for the different iconography present in
our extremist videos. We also use the help of AWS Mechanical Turk to both hasten and validate
this process by manual labelling from several workers. In Table 4.2, we have summarized the
different logos and their corresponding number of occurances in the dataset.
Table 4.2: Iconography from manually labelled extremist video dataset






As previously mentioned our first phase of experimentation expands on the work by Hara
et. al. whose work has been open sourced and available on GitHub. Our next phase of exper-
iments involving ISIS iconography will be based on the work of another popular paper whose
experimental setup has also been made public on GitHub. All the experiments were performed
on Intel 8-core i7 4820k 3.7 GHz Linux machine with 65GB physical memory and
Nvidia GeForce RTX 2080TI with 11GB of graphics memory.
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Figure 4.3: Testing and Validation Accuracy for Video Classification Model Based on Actions
4.2.1 Phase I: Classification into select sub-classes
4.2.1.1 Training
We perform training in two stages due to the lack of a large well labelled extremism to
begin with, however, we hope that by using a pretrained model and then fine-tuning on a smaller
subset will still allow for accurate classification with scores ≥ 0.85− 0.90.
In the first stage, we use the approximately 60 videos with 6 extremism classes to train
our model. The resulting testing/validation accuracy is portrayed in Figure 4.3. As can be seen
from the graph, despite a small number of videos in our training set, we are still able to achieve a
validation accuracy of roughly 80− 82%.
We then use the aforementioned model to run inference on roughly 500 thousand videos
and manually judge the model’s performance and filter out correctly classified videos from each
extremism subclass for improving the model further. We repeat the same training procedure with
a 80/20 split with the previously labelled dataset and the newly obtained dataset combined.
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4.2.1.2 Testing
The testing stage involves running the model against the entire subset of unlabelled videos and
accumulating the results. We perform testing in two main stages also - Transformation of Videos
and Inference. Firstly, we convert all the videos into jpeg image frames collected at every one
second interval. Next, we load the model and feed every video’s frames to obtain the corresponding
inference. Overall time taken to complete converting the videos to frames is about 16 hours with
10 jobs running, and inference by the model is also another 16 hours.
4.2.1.3 Evaluation
We perform evaluation of the model’s performance by manual checking for correctness. We
filter out videos with accuracy scores of > 0.95 (note that the sum of the scores among all classes
is 1) and we check whether the video indeed falls into the predicted class.
However, even during the initial results we notice strong red flags indicating that our model
is largely overestimating the number of extremist videos in our larger sample size. For example, of
the 48,000 unlabelled videos fed into the model for inference roughly 10,000 videos were labelled
as following into one of our extremist sub-classes with a confidence score of greater than 0.95.
However, from some of the videos it is quite evident the reason for misclassification. For example,
in several of the videos labelled as bombing we notice a large bright yellow spot like reflection on





4.2.2 Phase II: Classification based on iconography
4.2.2.1 Training
For training we start with a standard 80−20 training and validation split of our (frame, bounding_box)
pairs for the 473 manually labelled samples of ISIS Flags. We then train our SSD architecture Ten-
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Figure 4.4: Training Loss for Icon Detection Model
sorflow model for 7500 steps with a running time of 3 hours with about 1.5 seconds per step. The
training loss is provided in Figure 4.4 and we can see that our model performs best after about
5000 steps.
4.2.2.2 Evaluation
Finally, we use as precision@IoU and recall@IoU to determine the relevance of the
frames picked by our model as having extremist content and therefore judge the overall perfor-
mance of the model. These metric allows us to especially determine how well the classification
model does in this extremely imbalanced set of classes. A more formal definition of these tech-
niques is presented below.
Suppose we have a predicted bounding box for an image bboxpred and a ground truth bound-
ing box that we have manually labelled bboxtruth, then let bboxpred∩bboxtruth be the area of overlap
between these two boxes and bboxpred ∪ bboxtruth be the total area of the union of these two boxes.






Figure 4.5: Predicted bounding boxes (left) and ground truth bounding box (right)
Therefore, IoU = 1 would be that our predicted bounding box exactly overlays the grouth truth
and IoU = 0 means there is no overlap at all. Next, we define true positives as those validation
images with IoU > δ, false positives as those images with IoU < δ and false negatives as images
with no predicted bounding box. With these definitions we have,









Below we have listed the evaluation metrics from the trained model,
Average Precision @[ IoU=0.50 ] = 0.480
Average Precision @[ IoU=0.75 ] = 0.088
Average Recall @[ IoU=0.50:0.95 ] = 0.355
As we can see the Average Precision, which is simply the mean of the precision over all the tested
images, for δ = 0.50 is 0.480. This roughly translates to half the images having good predicted
bounding boxes. However, since in our detector the exact precision of the predicted bounding box
compared to the ground truth bounding box doesn’t matter and we are more interested in whether
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the model even produces a bounding box for an image with any reasonable level of certainty
(confidence level > 80). This is more clearly illustrated in the Figure 4.5. In this image we
can see predicted boxes on the left do a reasonably good job in detecting ISIS flags and therefore
videos with extremist content, but as per the evaluation metrics for object detection this would be
considered poor.
Finally, we use this new model to run inference on our 40,000 unlabelled videos. The
general setup involves splitting each video into 10 equally spaces frames which are then fed into
the model to detect ISIS Flag’s. Here we use a confidence threshold of 80% and for any images
that are predicted to have an ISIS Flag over this threshold, the corresponding video is tagged as
extremist. From this method we find that only 132 videos were tagged as extremist as compared to
the 10,000 videos from the action recognition technique. Therefore, that is a reduction by almost
hundredfold reducing the number of videos that need to be manually checked. However, based on
our inspection all the 132 videos classified are false positives. Furthermore, we do not know the
exact composition of extremist versus non-extremist videos from our unlabelled dataset, only the
fact that there is a heavy class imbalance.
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5. CONCLUSION
In this body of work, we have demonstrated the use of visual aids such as video clips in
order to identify more videos in social media as potentially extremist or containing radical content.
This technique allows us to bypass some of the challenges with only textual based extremism so-
cial media classifiers such as noise from variations in natural language and the general volatility of
human language and written text.
Additionally we have shown that ResNet’s employed in action recognition tasks from video
clips can be used to make meaningful predictions on videos containing traces of extremism, espe-
cially deep ResNet’s that are then fine-tuned to classify videos that are in domains quite different
from those that were used to train the models. Next, we also engineer a more ad hoc approach to
utilise symbols and flags, that are quite common across ISIS related extremism videos, to more
accurately predict radical videos from a large subset of unlabelled videos. We have also experi-
mentally compared the aforementioned two methods and see that the ad hoc method does indeed
perform better when it comes to classification of extremist content, however, it comes with the
downside of being organization specific and can easily overlook videos that do not contain any
symbolic representations of the corresponding organizations.
Finally, we see potential in utilising auditory decision variables into our classifier similar to
how we exploited symbols. These are clear indicators of videos from certain terrorist organizations
and could prove to be very accurate.
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